Corporate Ownership and Stock Price Volatility: An Empirical Study by N.Murugan, Suresha B
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.10, 2016 
 
1 
Corporate Ownership and Stock Price Volatility: An Empirical 
Study 
 
Suresha B1      Dr.N.Murugan2 
1.Department of Management Studies, Christ University, Bengaluru 029, PhD Research Scholar, Bharathiar 
University, Coimbatore – 641046 
2.Professor, PSNA College of Engineering, Dindigul – 624622 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between the firm ownership structure and price volatility. Ownership 
structure consists of promoter holdings, public shareholdings, institutional and non institutional holdings. 
Selected 26 Information Technology firms sample was taken for the study and it is found that largest shareholder 
in this sector is promoter and promoter group, who hold more than 45% stake in the firm. Public shareholding is 
the second largest. Institutional and non institutional investors have less than 25% shareholdings. Volatility is 
measured using standard Deviation and GARCH (1,1) is used to check the volatility persistence. It is found that 
price volatility is not significantly influenced by the firm ownership structure. This agrees with the notion that 
the price volatility is largely influenced by external macro economic variables and speculative forces of the 
market and internal factors like leverage and ownership structure has no significant influence on stock price 
volatility.  
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1. Introduction 
Category of corporate ownership is an imperative information, as it determines the number of stocks available 
for trading in the market at any given point of time. When a firm has less percentage of shares issued to the 
public and largest shareholder is the proprietors, it leads to less liquidity due to less number of shares available 
for trading in the market. SEBI in India has mandated 25% minimum public shareholding to bring in more retail 
participation and infuse liquidity in to the market. Proprietors with better access to information will have 
information advantage and abnormal return as compared to public shareholders. Compared to investors, 
managers have superior information about their firm’s investment opportunities and issue stock when it is 
overvalued; security prices therefore fall upon issuance since investors are wary of an information asymmetry 
problem (Myers (1984)). This information asymmetric causes for price volatility. This is a matter of corporate 
governance and needs attention of the regulatory system and curtails market volatility.  In this study it is 
observed that the largest shareholders in the Information Technology sector in listed companies are promoters. 
Public shareholding is less and more volatile stocks have more promoter shareholdings. This leads to conflict of 
interest between agent and principal. As per the agency cost theory internal cost that arises must be paid to an 
agent acting on behalf of a principal. Agency costs arise because of core problems such as conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and management. Shareholders wish for management to run the company in a way that 
increases shareholder value. But management may wish to grow the company in ways that maximize their 
personal power and wealth that may not be in the best interests of shareholders. As per pecking order theory the 
cost of corporate financing increases with asymmetric information. Financing comes from three sources, internal 
funds, debt and new equity. This leads to liquidity and stock return volatility.  
 
2.Literature review 
(Martin T. Bohl, Janusz Brzeszczyn ski b, and Bernd Wilflinga (2009)), provides an empirical evidence on the 
impact of institutional investors on stock market returns dynamics by performing Markov-switching-GARCH 
analysis evidences prove that the increase of institutional ownership has temporarily changed the volatility 
structure of aggregate stock returns. (Yabei Hu and Shigemi Izumida (2008)), laid the empirical evidence on the 
relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance from two perspectives namely, ownership 
concentration and managerial ownership. It focused on reasons for discrepancies among previous empirical 
research on ownership structure comprising of corporate governance environments, data issues, variable 
measurements, and estimation methods. (Nendi Juhandi, Made Sudarma, Siti Aisjah, Rofiaty (2013)), studied the 
effects of internal factors and stock ownership structure on dividend policy and their impacts on company’s 
value. It also examined the influence of dividend policy on company’s value. The results found proved that 
managerial ownership has no effect on dividend policy but on company’s value, while institutional ownership 
positively and significantly affects dividend payment and company’s value. This shows that corporate 
management is a representation of company’s ownership as a company’s control. (Baskin, 1989) has found 
significant negative relationship between dividend yield and volatility of stock’s price. Findings of (Hussainey et 
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al., 2011) also failed to support the study of (Baskin, 1989).  
 
3. Methodology 
The objective of the study is to determine the ownership structure of Information Technology sector and its 
composition relationship with the stock price volatility. The study attempts to verify the notion of largest public 
participation in the market leads to abnormal volatility in the sector. Data for this study is taken from the listed 
Information Technology companies in National stock exchange of India. The sample is derived from CNX500 
index which includes 26 companies of Information Technology sector. CNX 500 is India’s first broad based 
benchmark of the Indian capital market. The CNX 500 Index represents about 95.77% of the free float market 
capitalization of the stocks listed on NSE. The daily stock closing price data is taken from NSE website. 
Ownership structure data is taken from CMIE prowess data base. Stock volatility is the uncertainty or risk about 
the size of changes in a security's value. A higher volatility means that a security's value can potentially be 
spread out over a larger range of values. This means that the price of the stock can change considerably over a 
short time period in either ways. A lower volatility means that a stock value does not fluctuate dramatically, but 
changes in value at a steady pace over a period of time. Volatility is measured using standard deviation of the log 
stock returns. 
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Granger causality test is used to check the causal effect between the variables. It is a statistical concept of 
causality that is based on prediction. According to Granger causality, if a signal X1 "Granger-causes" (or "G-
causes") a signal X2, then past values of X1 should contain information that helps predict X2 above and beyond 
the information contained in past values of X2 alone. It is computed with the help of following equation. 
 
 
Jarque–Bera test is performed for sample companies to check the goodness-of-fit and verify whether sample data 
have the skewness and kurtosis matching a normal distribution. If the data come from a normal distribution, the 
JB statistic asymptotically has a chi-squared distribution with two degrees of freedom, so the statistic can be 
used to test the hypothesis that the data are from a normal distribution. It is computed with the help of following 
equation. 
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4. Results and Discussions 
Table 01 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Min Max Count 
Promoter Holdings 45.359 61.105 15.029 225.874 -0.929 29.510 78.100 26 
Public Holdings 41.599 38.895 14.960 223.787 -0.937 21.900 70.490 26 
Institutional  
shareholders 
23.665 21.965 14.919 222.563 -0.019 3.060 53.020 
26 
Non Institutional  
shareholders 
17.934 17.670 12.631 159.550 -1.094 3.500 39.280 
26 
ADR/GDR 0.042 0.000 0.177 0.031 18.000 0.000 0.750 26 
Among the sample firms that are listed in Indian National stock exchange, promoter’s shareholdings 
represent largest stake in the sector. Promoters are the largest block holders with mean holding of 45.35% in the 
industry. Public shareholdings are the second largest with the mean of 41.595. Institutional shareholders and non 
institutional investors have 23.66% and 17.935 respectively. Largest shareholders influence the market liquidity 
and volatility of the stock price. Their ability to trade in large quantity influences the market volumes and returns. 
This also leads to information asymmetric effect as the promoters have better access to vital information. Table 
02 indicates the volatility of stock returns. It is found that  the sectoral mean volatility is 7.8% with largest 
shareholding by promoters and public.  
Table 02 
Sectoral stock price volatility indicators 
 
Range Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
Information 
Technology 
.664 .003 .078 .006 -.944 .156 5.540 .312 
 
Table 04 
Correlation matrix 
 
Institutional 
Shareholders 
Non Institutional 
Shareholders Promoter Public Volatility 
Institutional 
Shareholders  1.000000 -0.465701 -0.559780  0.559780 -0.155441 
Non Institutional 
Shareholders -0.465701  1.000000 -0.472610  0.472610 -0.028890 
Promoter -0.559780 -0.472610  1.000000 -1.000000  0.181896 
Public  0.559780  0.472610 -1.000000  1.000000 -0.181896 
Volatility -0.155441 -0.028890  0.181896 -0.181896  1.000000 
Volatility of stock returns represents the changes in the prices of shares and it is believed to be more, 
when firm has more public shareholding than promoters. Correlation matrix table shows that stock price 
volatility and percentage of shares held by promoters is positively correlated, whereas the public shareholding, 
institutional and non institutional shareholdings has negative correlations. Public, Institutional and non 
institutional shareholding is positively correlated. As per pecking order theory, firms first prefer internal 
financing, and then debt, lastly raising through equity. This theory maintains that businesses adhere to a 
hierarchy of financing sources and prefer internal financing when available, and debt is preferred over equity if 
external financing is required.  
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5. OLS REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table 03 
Impact of ownership structure on stock price volatility of IT sector companies 
Dependent Variable: VOLATILITY  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 3040   
Included observations: 3020   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Public holdings 0.077622 0.005469 14.73430 0.0000 
Promoters holdings 0.054966 0.001897 35.15507 0.0000 
Non institutional holdings 0.093271 0.002876 28.99247 0.0000 
Institutional holdings 0.079201 0.002149 31.76566 0.0000 
C -0.270991 0.008342 -32.28559 0.0000 
R-squared 0.446871     Mean dependent var 0.184027 
Adjusted R-squared 0.456402     S.D. dependent var 0.042679 
S.E. of regression 0.025379     Akaike info criterion 4.508175 
Sum squared resid 1.941866     Schwarz criterion 4.498219 
Log likelihood 6912.344     F-statistic 1380.737 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.993271     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
The OLS results show that the category of ownership and its percentage of holdings has an influence on 
the stock price volatility. The ownership structure can explain the variance in the price volatility to the extent of 
44 percent. The individual variable coefficient is positive and  confirms that the larger the shareholdings with 
public and institutional entities can influence the volatility dynamics. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Ownership structure of Information Technology sector firms in India consists of promoter, Public, Institutional 
and non institutional investors. Largest shareholder in this sector is promoters, who hold more than 58% stake in 
the firm. Public shareholding is the second largest. Institutional and non institutional investors have less than 
25% shareholdings. The study was intended to verify whether the structure of firm ownership shareholding 
influence the stock price volatility. It is found that price volatility is not significantly influenced by the firm 
ownership structure. This agrees with the notion that the price volatility is largely influenced by external macro 
economic variables and speculative forces of the market and internal factors like leverage and ownership 
structure has no significant influence on stock price volatility.  
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